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|OriginOfSpecies - 475 Rows|
|06 - Difficutiles in Theory||06-13 - Summary: The Law of Unity of Type and of the Conditions of Existence Embraced by the Theory of Natural Selection||70||On the theory of natural selection we can clearly understand the full meaning of that old canon in natural history, "Natura non facit saltum." This canon, if we look to the present inhabitants alone of the world, is not strictly correct; but if we include all those of past times, whether known or unknown, it must on this theory be strictly true.|
|06 - Difficutiles in Theory||06-13 - Summary: The Law of Unity of Type and of the Conditions of Existence Embraced by the Theory of Natural Selection||80||
It is generally acknowledged that all organic beings have been formed on two great laws: Unity of Type, and the Conditions of Existence.
By unity of type is meant that fundamental agreement in structure which we see in organic beings of the same class, and which is quite independent of their habits of life.
On my theory, unity of type is explained by unity of descent.
The expression of conditions of existence, so often insisted on by the illustrious Cuvier, is fully embraced by the principle of natural selection.
For natural selection acts by either now adapting the varying parts of each being to its organic and inorganic conditions of life; or by having adapted them during past periods of time: the adaptations being aided in many cases by the increased use or disuse of parts, being affected by the direct action of the external conditions of life, and subjected in all cases to the several laws of growth and variation.
Hence, in fact, the law of the Conditions of Existence is the higher law; as it includes, through the inheritance of former variations and adaptations, that of Unity of Type.
|07 - Instinct||07-01 - Instincts comparable with habits, but different in their origin||10||
The subject of instinct might have been worked into the previous chapters; but I have thought that it would be more convenient to treat the subject separately, especially as so wonderful an instinct as that of the hive-bee making its cells will probably have occurred to many readers, as a difficulty sufficient to overthrow my whole theory.
I must premise, that I have nothing to do with the origin of the primary mental powers, any more than I have with that of life itself.
We are concerned only with the diversities of instinct and of the other mental qualities of animals within the same class.
I will not attempt any definition of instinct.
It would be easy to show that several distinct mental actions are commonly embraced by this term; but every one understands what is meant, when it is said that instinct impels the cuckoo to migrate and to lay her eggs in other birds' nests.
An action, which we ourselves should require experience to enable us to perform, when performed by an animal, more especially by a very young one, without any experience, and when performed by many individuals in the same way, without their knowing for what purpose it is performed, is usually said to be instinctive.
But I could show that none of these characters of instinct are universal.
A little dose, as Pierre Huber expresses it, of judgment or reason, often comes into play, even in animals very low in the scale of nature.
Frederick Cuvier and several of the older metaphysicians have compared instinct with habit.
This comparison gives, I think, a remarkably accurate notion of the frame of mind under which an instinctive action is performed, but not of its origin.
How unconsciously many habitual actions are performed, indeed not rarely in direct opposition to our conscious will! yet they may be modified by the will or reason. Habits easily become associated with other habits, and with certain periods of time and states of the body.
When once acquired, they often remain constant throughout life. Several other points of resemblance between instincts and habits could be pointed out.
|07 - Instinct||07-01 - Instincts comparable with habits, but different in their origin||20||
As in repeating a well-known song, so in instincts, one action follows another by a sort of rhythm; if a person be interrupted in a song, or in repeating anything by rote, he is generally forced to go back to recover the habitual train of thought: so P. Huber found it was with a caterpillar, which makes a very complicated hammock; for if he took a caterpillar which had completed its hammock up to, say, the sixth stage of construction, and put it into a hammock completed up only to the third stage, the caterpillar simply re-performed the fourth, fifth, and sixth stages of construction.
If, however, a caterpillar were taken out of a hammock made up, for instance, to the third stage, and were put into one finished up to the sixth stage, so that much of its work was already done for it, far from feeling the benefit of this, it was much embarrassed, and, in order to complete its hammock, seemed forced to start from the third stage, where it had left off, and thus tried to complete the already finished work.
If we suppose any habitual action to become inherited and I think it can be shown that this does sometimes happen then the resemblance between what originally was a habit and an instinct becomes so close as not to be distinguished.
If Mozart, instead of playing the piano forte at three years old with wonderfully little practice, had played a tune with no practice at all, he might truly be said to have done so instinctively.
But it would be the most serious error to suppose that the greater number of instincts have been acquired by habit in one generation, and then transmitted by inheritance to succeeding generations.
It can be clearly shown that the most wonderful instincts with which we are acquainted, namely, those of the hive-bee and of many ants, could not possibly have been thus acquired.